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PART I: INTRODUCTION
Cape Cod, Massachusetts may soon become home to something other than 
quaint towns and peaceful beaches.  If a Massachusetts-based company named 
Cape Wind Associates, LLC (“Cape Wind”) overcomes various administrative and 
political hurdles, Cape Cod will become home to the first offshore wind park in 
the United States (“Cape Wind project” or “the project”).2  Although no such 
projects currently exist in the United States, some European countries already 
utilize this offshore technology.3  With completion expected in 2005,4 the project 
1 B.A. 1999 Cornell University, J.D. 2002 Boston University School of Law, LL.M.         
in Environmental Law 2004 The George Washington University Law School.  Associate at 
Cooper, Rose & English, LLP in Summit, New Jersey.  This thesis was presented to the faculty of 
The George Washington University Law School, in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the 
degree of Master of Laws.
2 The project will be located in Horseshoe Shoal, which is part of Nantucket Sound.  
Nantucket Sound is located in between the southern Cape Cod shore, Nantucket, and Martha’s 
Vineyard.  See infra Part II.A.ii.  
3 Denmark and the United Kingdom are pioneering offshore wind power in Europe.  
Denmark maintains the largest offshore wind park to date, consisting of eighty turbines with a 
maximum capacity of 160 megawatts.  Michael Schulz, Questions Blowing in the Wind: The 
Development of Offshore Wind as a Renewable Source of Energy in the United States, 38 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 415, 418 (2004).  The United Kingdom has already built one offshore wind park at 
North Hoyle, and another is under construction at Scroby Sands.  British Wind Energy 
Association, UK in fast lane to becoming world leader in offshore wind, http://www.bwea.com/ 
media/news/round2results.html (Dec. 18, 2003).  Britain’s Crown Estate, which leases the 
4will rival Europe’s offshore wind parks.  The project will have 130 turbines 
producing an average output of 185 megawatts and producing a maximum output 
of 420 megawatts.5
Inland wind power constitutes a small yet increasing portion of the United 
States’ total power generation portfolio.6  Wind energy accounted for one-tenth of 
one percent of national generation as of the year 2000.7  In contrast, coal supplied 
nation’s seabed in its territorial waters, consented to fifteen new offshore projects in late 2003.  
Id.     
4 As of April 2004, the Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) is completing its review in 
preparation of a draft environmental impact statement.  The current estimate for completion of the 
draft environmental impact statement is at least July 2004, with a permit decision no earlier than 
2005.  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fact Sheet, http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/projects/ma/ 
ccwf/farmfact.pdf (Mar. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. 
5 This maximum output would only occur in heavy wind conditions, with the turbines 
operating at peak performance.  Jay S. Polachek, Cape Cod: Twisting in the Wind?, Fortnightly, 
May 15, 2002, at 34 (interview with Cape Wind president James Gordon).  Typical wind turbines 
operate sixty to eighty percent of the time, and on average operate at full capacity ten percent of 
the time.  American Wind Energy Association, Wind Energy Fast Facts, http://www.awea.org/ 
pubs/factsheets/FastFacts2003.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2004).  The average yearly output of 
wind turbines is thirty to thirty-five percent capacity.  Id.  
Nevertheless, the average output of the Cape Wind project will be enough to supply the 
Cape and the Islands with about seventy percent of the average electrical demand.  Lisa Biank 
Fasig, Wind farmers plow ahead – Developers choose manufacturer, reduce number of planned 
turbines, The Providence Journal, Jan. 22, 2003, 2003 WL 7052136.
6 Although wind production constitutes a small share of the United States’ total energy 
production, wind energy development has increased substantially since 1980.  Total installed 
capacity in 1981 was ten megawatts.  As of 2002, total installed capacity was 4685 megawatts.  
American Wind Energy Association, Wind Power: U.S. Installed Capacity (Megawatts) 1981-
2003, at http://www.awea.org/faq/instcap.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).  The eighty percent 
decrease in the price of domestic wind power since 1980 is due partially to this increased 
production.  See American Wind Energy Association, Buying Wind Energy on the Retail Market, 
at http://www.awea.org/pubs/factsheets/grnmrkt.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
7 NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY (2001), 
at 6-6 [hereinafter National Energy Policy].
5fifty-two percent of the nation’s electric energy needs in 2000, with nuclear power 
and natural gas providing twenty and sixteen percent, respectively.8
Several reasons exist for wind’s low market share.9  In addition to these, a 
significant reason is that only certain areas of the country allow for economically 
8 Id. at 6-6. 
9 Reasons for wind energy’s low market share include (1) the variability of a given 
turbine’s energy production; (2) more expensive costs of financing; (3) reliance upon the federal 
production tax credit; and (4) more expensive construction costs.  
Small changes in wind speed dramatically affect electric power output from wind 
turbines.  The potential energy from a turbine is proportional to the cube of the wind speed.  See
American Wind Energy Association, The Economics of Wind Energy, http://www.awea.org/ 
pubs/factsheets/EconomicsofWind-March2002.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Wind 
Energy Economics].  This means that a turbine produces fifty percent more energy from sixteen 
mile per hour winds than from fourteen mile per hour winds. Id.  Therefore, even in areas with 
excellent wind potential, daily fluctuations of small magnitude yield big differences in output and 
reliability.
The financing of wind parks is more expensive than the financing of other energy 
sources.  Wind parks are capital-intensive projects, which are very sensitive to interest rates.  
Additionally, private developers do not receive as favorable terms as do large institutional 
utilities.  Wind Energy Economics, supra.  American financiers often regard wind power projects 
to be more risky, which also increases the interest rate.  Id.  There is also much uncertainty due to 
the novelty of an offshore wind power infrastructure, probable weather-related construction 
delays, variable operation and maintenance costs, and the effect of harsh ocean conditions on the 
equipment.  Renewable Energy World, Offshore Wind Ready to power a sustainable Europe, at
http://www.jxj.com/magsanddj/rew/2002_01/ca-owee.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).  
Wind energy prices remain reasonably competitive due to the production tax credit 
(“PTC”).  In turn, though, this competitiveness relies upon the PTC’s continuation.  The Energy 
Policy Act of 1992 established the PTC.  Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486,          
§ 1212, 106 Stat. 2776, 2969-70 (1992).  The PTC is a 1.5 cent per kilowatt hour tax credit that      
is available to businesses that build and operate wind energy facilities and sell the power to 
unrelated parties.  The PTC may be claimed for ten years after a new wind energy facility begins 
operation.  See Christine Real de Azua, The Future of Wind Energy, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 485, 
499-500 (2001).  Since the credit is adjusted for inflation, the current PTC is 1.7 cents per 
kilowatt hour.  See Wind Energy Economics, supra.  Congress extended the PTC in 2002 by the 
Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 603, 116 Stat. 21, 59 
(2002).  See Wind Energy Economics, supra.  This extension expired on December 31, 2003.  Id.  
The wind energy industry is currently seeking an extension until 2006.  Id.  This extension would 
take effect provided that Congress passes the Energy Policy Act of 2003 (S. 2095).  The PTC 
extension is contained in Title XIII of S. 2095.  As of April 2004, S. 2095 is pending in the 
Senate.  
6feasible wind power production.10  All current wind parks exist inland, in regions 
that offer an appreciable and relatively consistent supply of wind.11  Without 
enough wind, turbines either do not produce enough power to be financially 
Cape Wind President James Gordon has admitted that the PTC is crucial to the project’s 
success, saying that the project would not have been possible without the tax break.  Cosmo 
Macero Jr., Tax credit powering windmills, The Boston Herald, July 28, 2003, at A11, 2003 WL 
3032738.  The PTC is worth a substantial amount of money to Cape Wind.  “By one analysis, if 
you measure by megawatt hour, the production credit alone is worth about $18 or $19 per MWh 
to Cape Wind.  Put another way, based on an estimated annual output of 1.5 million megawatt 
hours, Cape Wind’s subsidy would be in the vicinity of $27 million a year.”  Id.     
Finally, wind energy on average is more expensive to construct and install per megawatt 
than it is for more conventional energy facilities.  For example, a FPL Energy spokesperson 
stated that a megawatt of wind power costs about $1 million to develop, while natural gas 
projects cost $550,000 to $700,000 per megawatt.  Environment News, New England’s EMI 
plans 420 MW Nantucket wind farm, at http://planetark.com/dailynewsstory/cfm/newsid/13035/ 
newsDate/31-Oct-2001/story.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2004).  Thus the attractiveness of 
constructing wind power projects depends somewhat upon the comparative cost of natural gas 
and other fuels.  Id.  “‘When natural gas prices are high, wind is more competitive.  When natural 
gas prices are low, wind power is less competitive.’”  Id.  FPL Energy LLC (a subsidiary of FPL 
Group Inc.) is a major developer of wind power projects.  American Wind Energy Association, 
Wind Energy Industry Contacts, http://www.awea.org/newsroom/Industrycontacts.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2004).     
10 National Energy Policy, supra note 7, at 6-3, fig. 6-1 (illustrating that the northeastern, 
Appalachian, Rocky Mountain, and west coast regions have “good” to “excellent” wind power 
potential).  The top four states, rated by total wind energy potential, are North Dakota, Texas, 
Kansas, and South Dakota, offering 1210, 1190, 1070, and 1030 billion kilowatt hours, 
respectively.  American Wind Energy Association, Wind Energy: An Untapped Resource, 
http://www.awea.org/pubs/factsheets/top20.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2004).  The states with the 
most wind power production as of December 31, 2003 are California, Texas, Minnesota, and 
Iowa, with installed capacities of 2043, 1293, 563, and 471 megawatts, respectively.  American 
Wind Energy Association, Wind Power Outlook 2004, http://www.awea.org/pubs/documents/ 
Outlook2004.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2004).   
Massachusetts’ current wind energy output is 0.98 megawatts.  American Wind Energy 
Association, Massachusetts Wind Energy Development, http://www.awea.org/projects/ 
massachusetts.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).
11 See American Wind Energy Association, The Most Frequently Asked Questions About 
Wind Energy, http://www.awea.org/pubs/documents/FAQ2002%20·%20web.PDF, at 3 (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2004) (establishing that small wind turbines require average annual wind speeds 
of at least nine miles per hour, while large utility-scale projects require an average of at least 
thirteen miles per hour).
7viable, or produce adequate power but on an unpredictable basis.  Building 
offshore wind parks takes advantage of previously untapped areas that offer a 
more consistent supply of higher wind speeds.  Nantucket Sound is one of those 
places, being described as the “‘Saudi Arabia of wind in the United States.’”12
Once a proper federal approval scheme is in place, similar projects may 
appear off of many shore communities by the end of this decade.13  Before this 
scenario occurs, however, the courts and Congress must confront the debated and 
litigated legal issues.  The Cape Wind project has survived litigation in the U.S 
12 Corps of Engineers to Undertake Full Review of Mass. Offshore Wind Project, Utility 
Environment Report, Feb. 8, 2002, 2002 WL 11408511.  
13 Similar projects are planned by other companies such as Winergy LLC of Shirley,      
New York (“Winergy”).  Winergy filed a permit application with the Corps in July 2002 for     
four potential wind parks off of Nantucket, Massachusetts, one of which will be developed.    
Beth Daley, Second Firm Proposes Wind Energy Farm off Massachusetts Coast, Knight-Ridder 
Tribune Business News: The Boston Globe, July 25, 2002, 2002 WL 24838529.  In February 
2003, Winergy filed a separate application with the Corps for a test tower in Nantucket Sound.  
Developer Files for Army Corps Okay to Build Wind Farm Near Nantucket, Electric Utility 
Week, Feb. 3, 2003, 2003 WL 11143342.  Winergy is “a coastal development company that 
handles the permitting stage of power plant projects.”  Massachusetts Wind Developers Seek 
Permit for up to 831 MW off Nantucket, Northeast Power Report, July 29, 2002, 2002 WL 
11404696.  Winergy has also considered other sites off of the New York, New Jersey, Delaware, 
Maryland, and Virginia coasts.  Sonja Barisic, Wind Farm Plan Draws Criticism, AP Online,  
Jan. 6, 2003, 2003 WL 2924074.  Winergy’s potential customers include utilities, local 
commercial users, and governments.  Wind farm plan hits resistance by greens, The Cincinnati 
Post, Feb. 7, 2003, 2003 WL 2910661.
In January 2003, the Long Island Power Authority of New York (“LIPA”) requested 
proposals for 100 to 140 megawatts of offshore wind power.  American Wind Energy 
Association, Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) Issues Request for Proposals for Offshore 
Wind Power, Jan. 22, 2003, at http://www.awea.org/news/news030122lipa.html.  The intended 
project would consist of twenty-five to fifty turbines, be located about two and a half miles 
offshore (in state waters), and begin operation in 2007.  LIPA May Take Bids to Build New Line 
to Interconnect Offshore Wind Power, Power Markets Week, Jan. 27, 2003, 2003 WL 11157806.  
LIPA would sign a fifteen to twenty year power-purchase agreement from the selected 
developer/owner.  LIPA issues RFP for up to 140 MW from wind farm, Megawatt Daily, Jan. 24, 
2003, 2003 WL 11128480.
8District Court for the District of Massachusetts as of 2003.14  A single district 
court’s approval, however, does not guarantee that the existing laws are sufficient 
to support a future offshore wind energy industry.
Opponents of the Cape Wind project contend that the granting of permits 
for these offshore structures is illegal.15  This claim finds significant basis in three 
federal legal sources: the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”),16 the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”)17 regulations,18 and the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).19  Opponents argue that the Corps does not 
have authority under OCSLA to permit wind turbine structures on the outer 
continental shelf (“OCS”).20  In addition, they argue that Cape Wind lacks the 
14 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 288 F. Supp. 2d 64 
(D. Mass. 2003).
15 The Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound’s website lists various reasons in its Legal 
Concerns section as to why the Cape Wind project is illegal.  The Alliance to Protect Nantucket 
Sound, Legal Concerns, at http://www.saveoursound.org/legal.html#TheUSArmyCorps (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2004)  [hereinafter Legal Concerns].  Such legal issues include the Corps’ 
inadequate permitting authority, Cape Wind’s lack of property interest, violation of the public 
trust, inadequate state and local involvement, lack of framework to evaluate the proposals, 
segmentation of the project, need to comply with all relevant environmental laws, and Nantucket 
Sound’s protected status.
16 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2000).
17
“The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been involved in regulating certain activities in 
the nation’s waters since 1890.”  33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(1).
18 33 C.F.R. §§ 320-330 (2002).
19 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f) (2000).
20 Legal Concerns, supra note 15.  The outer continental shelf is defined as “all submerged 
lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters . . . and of which 
the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and 
control.”  43 U.S.C. § 1331(a).
9requisite property interest in the site.21  Furthermore, the opponents contend that 
the Corps must produce a full environmental impact statement (“EIS”) before any 
phase begins, even if that phase only involves installing a temporary data tower.22
These are three nationally applicable issues that must be resolved before offshore 
wind power becomes common in the United States.
In addition to these national issues, the Cape Wind controversy also 
involves concerns of more local application.  Opponents argue that the Cape Wind 
project will threaten Horseshoe Shoal’s wildlife, impede navigation, discourage 
tourism, and be aesthetically unpleasing.23  Furthermore, the opponents claim that 
Massachusetts should have a more influential role in the permitting decision.24
Although such local concerns are important, this thesis does not address 
these issues.  Impacts upon wildlife, tourism, and aesthetics may be relevant to 
other proposed developments in the future.  However, these factors are very site-
specific.  Therefore a discussion of how they relate to the Cape Wind project may 
21 Id.  See also 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(g)(6) (“The applicant’s signature on an application is an 
affirmation that the applicant possesses or will possess the requisite property interest to undertake 
the activity proposed in the application.”); 33 C.F.R. § 325.1(d)(7) (same).
This paper does not analyze the property interest issue.  The court in Alliance to Protect 
Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 288 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass. 2003) did not 
address the merits of this issue.  The court did not require Cape Wind to prove a property interest 
in the OCS, but merely to affirm a property interest.  Alliance, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 77.  In fact, the 
Court said that the regulations as written do not allow the Corps to challenge an applicant’s 
affirmation of a property interest.  Id. at 77-78.
22 See Legal Concerns, supra note 15.
23 See The Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, The Worst Location, at
http://www.saveoursound.org/bestworst.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
24 See Legal Concerns, supra note 15.
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not apply or be relevant to another project.  This thesis addresses the federal 
permitting issues concerning any proposed offshore project at this time.  
Part II of this thesis reviews the Cape Wind project’s historical and factual 
backgrounds.  Subpart A discusses the project’s management, design, and history.  
Subpart B then addresses the subsequent litigation in which groups such as Ten 
Taxpayers Citizen Group and the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound challenged 
the permitting process.25
Part III establishes the legal background.  Subpart A presents section 10 of 
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (“RHA”),26 and explains how it grants 
authority to the Corps over obstructions to navigation in “navigable waters.”  
Subpart B then demonstrates how OCSLA expanded the Corps’ geographical 
jurisdiction.  Subpart C introduces NEPA and its implementing regulations.      
Part IV analyzes the legal issues.  Subpart A addresses whether the Corps 
has authority under OCSLA to permit structures on the OCS that are not used for 
resource or mineral extraction, and demonstrates that the Corps does have this 
authority.  Subpart B then assumes that the Corps has this authority, and discusses 
the proper stage in the construction process at which to require an environmental 
25 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 288 F. Supp. 2d    
64 (D. Mass. 2003); Ten Taxpayers Citizen Group v. Cape Wind Assoc., LLC, 278 F. Supp. 2d 
(D. Mass. 2003); Ten Taxpayers Citizen Group v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, No. 02-11907          
(D. Mass. Nov. 5, 2002) (voluntarily dismissed). 
26 Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000).
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impact statement.  The conclusion is that these projects may be “segmented,” 
exempting the initial data tower phase from the EIS process.  
Part V then reviews legislation that has been proposed in the 107th and 108th
Congresses concerning offshore alternative energy production.  This section 
includes the pending 2004 energy bill.  The main purpose of this section is to 
illustrate how the current approval framework (or lack of framework depending 
upon one’s view) is on the verge of dramatic change.  The current jurisdictional 
and legal disputes, as addressed in this thesis, hopefully will become irrelevant 
once these changes are made.     
Part VI concludes the thesis.
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PART II: HISTORICAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Cape Wind project
i. Cape Wind Associates, LLC
Cape Wind Associates, LLC is a Massachusetts-based company, the 
purpose of which is to “develop, own and operate wind-power production facilities 
to be developed and located in Federal Waters offshore of Cape Cod, Nantucket, 
and Martha’s Vineyard . . . .”27  Cape Wind is a joint venture between its 
management company Energy Management, Inc. (“EMI”), and Wind Management 
LLC.28  Since 1975, EMI has developed energy conservation and pollution control 
projects, developed independent power projects such as six natural gas-fired 
electric plants, and now concentrates on renewable energy projects.29
ii. Project design   
Construction of the Cape Wind project will occur in two phases: a 
temporary data tower and then the actual wind park.  It is likely that other offshore 
wind park developments in the future will entail this two-step approach, since 
27 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS CORPORATIONS DIVISION, ANNUAL REPORT OF 
CAPE WIND ASSOCIATES, LLC (2003), available at http://corp.sec.state.ma.us/corp/corpsearch/
corpsearchinput.asp.
28 Schulz, supra note 3, at 421.
29 Id.
13
voluminous data must be confirmed before millions of dollars are spent on 
construction.30
The data tower31 is a single structure that rises approximately 200 feet 
above the water’s surface, and collects meteorological and oceanographic data.32
The data collected include wind speed, wind direction, ocean currents, wave 
height, and salinity.33  The tower received a separate permit from the Corps.34
The wind park will be a $700 million project35 that will utilize 130 large 
turbines to generate electricity. 36  The 130 turbines will be located in a twenty-
four square mile area of Nantucket Sound,37 with Cape Cod over four miles to the 
30 The purpose of the data tower is to confirm that the selected area offers conditions that 
will ensure the project’s success.
31 The data tower is formally called a “Scientific Measurement Devices Station.”  U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, Corps issues permit to Cape Wind for scientific data tower in 
Nantucket Sound, at http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/news/2002-103.htm (Aug. 19, 2002).  
32 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Cape Wind applies for Corps permit to install scientific 
measuring tower in Nantucket Sound, at http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/news/2001-162.htm 
(Dec. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Tower Application Notice]. 
33 Schulz, supra note 3, at 425.  
34 See infra Part IV.B. 
35 Mark Reynolds, In the wind – Turbine farm plan for Cape generates a debate, The 
Providence Journal, June 15, 2003, 2003 WL 57177420.
36 Cape Wind originally proposed the installation of 170 turbines.  Intent to Prepare a Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for Proposed Cape Wind Energy Project, Nantucket 
Sound and Yarmouth, MA Application for Corps Section 10/404 Individual Permit, 67 Fed. Reg. 
4414 (Jan. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Project Notice].  However, Cape Wind’s January 2003 decision 
to use 3.6 megawatt GE Wind Energy turbines reduced the number to 130.  “‘Our goal all along 
was not to do 170 wind turbines.  The goal was to have the capacity of 420 megawatts.’”  Fasig, 
supra note 5 (statement of Cape Wind spokesperson Mark Rodgers).
37 Reynolds, supra note 35.
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north, Nantucket about eleven miles to the southeast, and Martha’s Vineyard over 
five miles to the west. 38  The 3.6 megawatt GE Wind Energy turbines39 consist of 
246-foot-tall towers, fitted with 165-foot-long blades.40  Buried in the ocean floor 
would be a power line network that interconnects the turbines.41  The combined 
power will be transmitted to shore via two 115 kilovolt lines, at which point those 
submarine cables will connect with other underground cables that eventually link 
with the southeastern Massachusetts grid.42
iii. Project chronology 
Cape Wind submitted two permit applications to the Corps for the data 
tower and wind park in November 2001.43  The Corps publicly announced on 
December 4, 2001 that it was considering the data tower application.44  The wind 
38 Project Notice, supra note 36, at 4415/1.
39 The new 3.6 megawatt turbines utilize larger generators and are designed for higher wind 
speeds.  Offshore Cape Cod Wind Farm to Cut Number of Turbines with New Technology, 
Electric Utility Week, Jan. 27, 2003, 2003 WL 11143273.  GE Wind Energy is a part of General 
Electric’s Power Systems arm.  General Electric bought Enron’s wind turbine business in 2002.  
Beth Demain Reigber, GE Sees Tailwind in Wind Energy as Alternatives Eyed, Dow Jones 
Business News, Sept. 12, 2003, http://www.anetenergy.com/news/030912_gewind.htm.
40 Reynolds, supra note 35.
41 Id.
42 Project Notice, supra note 36, at 4414/3.  The electricity supplied by the Cape Wind park 
will generally be consumed on the Cape, unless the turbines are producing more electricity than 
required by the Cape’s 230 megawatt average demand.  At that point, the surplus power would 
travel to and be used on the mainland.  Cape Wind Associates, LLC, Independent Experts Agree, 
Cape Wind’s Electricity Will Power Cape & Islands and Reduce Pollution, at 
http://www.capewind.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). 
43 Fact Sheet, supra note 4. 
44 Tower Application Notice, supra note 32.
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park’s need for an EIS was then announced on January 30, 2002.45  The Corps 
issued a permit for the data tower on August 19, 2002,46 which led to litigation in 
Massachusetts state and federal courts.47  An EIS status meeting was held on 
November 21, 2002. 48  As of April 2004, the Corps and seventeen other federal 
and state agencies are conducting an extensive environmental review of Cape 
Wind’s wind park application.49
45 Project Notice, supra note 36, at 4414/3.  After this public announcement, scoping 
meetings concerning the wind park were held on March 6 and 7, 2002.  U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, Public Scoping Meetings on Wind Farm Project EIS, at http://www.nae.usace.army. 
mil/projects/ma/ccwf/scopemeeteis.pdf (Jan. 29, 2002).  Public hearings were held on April 8, 
2002 for the data tower and wind park and on April 11, 2002 for the data tower.  See U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, Cape Cod Wind Farm Permit Application Meeting Transcripts (PDF), at 
http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/projects/ma/ccwf/farmmeetings.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2004).  
46 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Corps issues permit to Cape Wind for scientific data 
tower in Nantucket Sound, http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/news/2002-103.htm (Aug. 19, 2002).
47 See infra Part II.B.
48 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Wind Farm EIS status public meeting set for Nov. 21 in 
Bourne, http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/news/2002-142.html (Nov. 13, 2002).
49 The environmental review process is expected to continue through the summer of 2004.  
See Fact Sheet, supra note 4.
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B. Litigation   
i. Ten Taxpayers Citizen Group v. Cape Wind Assoc., LLC 50
Ten Taxpayers Citizen Group (“Ten Taxpayers” or “plaintiffs”) sought and 
received a temporary restraining order on September 24, 2002 in Barnstable 
Superior Court.51  The temporary restraining order was for Cape Wind’s 
construction of the data tower, planned to begin on October 7, 2002.52  Cape Wind 
filed for removal of the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts in Boston on October 21, 2002.53  Construction of the data tower 
then began on October 27, 2002 after the temporary restraining order expired.54
Ten Taxpayers filed a motion to remand the case on November 5, 2002.55
The court denied this motion, and the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit on November 21, 2002.56  The First Circuit dismissed 
the appeal on February 21, 2003.57
50 Ten Taxpayers Citizen Group v. Cape Wind Assoc., LLC, 278 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 
2003).
51 Ten Taxpayers Citizen Group v. Cape Wind Assoc., LLC, No. BACV2002-00645 (Mass. 
Super. Ct.).
52 Ten Taxpayers, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 99.
53 Civil Docket, Ten Taxpayers Citizen Group v. Cape Wind Assoc., LLC, No. 02-CV-
12046 (D. Mass.) [hereinafter Ten Taxpayers I Docket].
54 Ten Taxpayers, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 99.
55 Ten Taxpayers I Docket, supra note 53.
56 Id.
57 Id.
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The case proceeded in district court until August 19, 2003, at which point 
the court granted Cape Wind’s motion to dismiss the Ten Taxpayers’ complaint as 
a matter of law.58  In the lawsuit, plaintiffs claimed that Cape Wind could not 
construct the test tower without complying with Massachusetts’ fisheries 
regulations and obtaining a state permit.59  The issue was whether the tower 
required a state license.60  Although the plaintiffs conceded that waters more than 
three miles from shore are generally under federal jurisdiction, Ten Taxpayers 
proposed that the federal government ceded jurisdiction to Massachusetts under 
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (“Magnuson 
Act”).61  The Magnuson Act in part granted jurisdiction to Massachusetts over 
Nantucket Sound.62
The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim though, because this grant of 
jurisdiction over Nantucket sound was for very limited purposes.63  The purpose of 
the Magnuson Act is the regulation of fishing.64  The court held that “nothing in 
58 Ten Taxpayers, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 100.
59 Id. at 99.
60 Id.
61 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1800-1803   
(2000).
62 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a)(2) (“[T]he jurisdiction and authority of a State shall extend . . . with 
respect to the body of water commonly known as Nantucket Sound, to the pocket of water west of 
the seventieth meridian west of Greenwich.”).
63 Ten Taxpayers, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 100-01.
64 16 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1824, 1826-1826(g), 1851-1854.  See also Ten Taxpayers, 278 F. 
Supp. 2d at 100-01.
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the Act supports the proposition that regulating non-fishing activities simply for 
the protection of fish falls under the Commonwealth’s jurisdiction.”65  Therefore, 
Cape Wind was not required to seek a state permit for the data tower.66
ii. Ten Taxpayers Citizen Group v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army 67
Ten Taxpayers sought and received a ten-day temporary restraining order 
against the U.S. Department of the Army, the Army Corps of Engineers, and Cape 
Wind in Barnstable Superior Court on September 27, 2002.68  On that same day a 
notice of removal to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in 
Boston was filed.69  Once the case was removed, Cape Wind made a motion to 
vacate the temporary restraining order.70  Ten Taxpayers filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction.71  On October 8, 2002, the district court denied the 
65 Ten Taxpayers, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 101.
66 Id.  
67 Ten Taxpayers Citizen Group v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, No. 02-CV-11907, (D. Mass. 
Nov. 5, 2002) (voluntarily dismissed).
68 Challengers win first round against Corps for approving offshore tower, Corps Report, 
Oct. 2, 2002, 2002 WL 10834556.
69 Civil Docket, Ten Taxpayers Citizen Group v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, No. 02-CV-
11907, (D. Mass.) [hereinafter Ten Taxpayers II Docket]. 
70 Id.
71 Id.
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plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.72  The parties then voluntarily 
dismissed the case and the case closed on November 5, 2002.73
iii. Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of            
the Army 74
Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army
challenged the validity of the August 19, 2002 permit for the Cape Wind data 
tower.75  Filed on August 30, 2002 in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound and individual plaintiffs 
(collectively “Alliance” or “plaintiffs”)76 alleged several faults with the permit 
process, and sought equitable relief.77   The Alliance claimed that the Corps 
exceeded its jurisdiction, ignored the permit application’s facial deficiency, and 
72 Joe Truini, Windmills in a choppy surf: Cape Cod wind farm proposal faces lawsuits, 
Waste News, Oct. 14, 2002, 2002 WL 10367810.
73 Ten Taxpayers II Docket, supra note 69.
74 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 288 F. Supp. 2d 64 
(D. Mass. 2003) (denial of plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and granting of defendants’ 
and intervenor’s cross-motions for summary judgment). 
75 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Permit No. 199902477, available at
http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/projects/ma/ccwt/permit.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2004).
76 The plaintiffs’ complaint describes the Alliance as a not-for-profit organization 
comprised of “concerned citizens, businesses, towns and local government and civic groups, trade 
associations, environmental and advocacy interests, and associations of fishing interests and 
boaters that oppose industrialization of Nantucket Sound.”  Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief ¶ 6, Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 288 F. 
Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass. 2003) (No. 02-11749) [hereinafter Alliance Complaint].   
77 Alliance Complaint, supra note 76.
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failed to comply with procedural and substantive requirements.78  The Corps 
responded to the Alliance Complaint by denying the allegations.79
First, the plaintiffs challenged the issuance of the permit based upon the 
Corps’ lack of permitting authority.  The Complaint’s first count argued that 
OCSLA does not allow the Corps to permit structures that are unrelated to oil and 
gas exploration and extraction.80  The Corps’ authority under RHA section 10 only 
applies to the navigable waters of the United States within three nautical miles 
from shore.81  OCSLA extended this geographic authority for very limited 
purposes, none of which include permitting wind turbines.82
The second count charged the Corps with ignoring its own regulatory 
requirement.83  The applicant for a section 10 permit must affirm by its signature 
that it possesses or will possess a property interest in the site.84  The Corps 
allegedly knew that Cape Wind possessed no such interest, since the federal 
government maintains exclusive control and “ownership” of the outer continental 
78 Id. ¶ 2.
79 Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 288 F. 
Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass. 2003) (No. 02-11749).
80 Alliance Complaint, supra note 76, ¶ 33. See also Part IV.A, infra.
81 Alliance Complaint, supra note 76, ¶ 32.
82 Id. ¶ 24.
83 Id. ¶ 40 (rendering the permit as “arbitrary and capricious, and abuse of discretion, and 
otherwise not in accordance with law . . .”). 
84 Id. ¶ 37.  See also note 21, supra.
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shelf.85  Nor was there reason to believe that Congress would grant an interest to 
Cape Wind.86
The third count asserted a number of procedural and substantive errors in 
connection with the data tower permitting process.  These included issuing, 
without comment, a finding of no significant impact (“FONSI”) based upon a 
faulty environmental assessment (“EA”).87  Plaintiffs considered the EA to be 
erroneous because it did not analyze alternatives from a public interest 
perspective,88 and segmented the entire project into (1) the data tower and (2) the 
actual wind park.89
Cape Wind then intervened in October 2002 and filed its own answer to the 
Alliance Complaint on November 7, 2002, denying the allegations in a more 
substantive manner.90  In response to count one, Cape Wind contended that the 
plaintiffs’ position that OCSLA does not allow for permitting wind turbines is 
contrary to long-standing interpretations.91  Regarding the property interest issue 
85 Alliance Complaint, supra note 76, ¶¶ 38-39.
86 Id.
87 Id. ¶¶ 42, 44.  See infra Parts III.C and IV.B for more discussion of these terms.
88 Alliance Complaint, supra note 76, ¶ 43a.
89 Id. ¶ 43d.  See infra Part IV.B.
90 Cape Wind Associates, LLC’s Answer to First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 288 F. 
Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass. 2003) (No. 02-11749) [hereinafter Cape Wind Answer].
91 Cape Wind Answer, supra note 90, ¶ 37.
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of count two, the Answer clarified the plaintiffs’ assertion of government 
ownership.  Cape Wind conceded that the federal government does maintain 
exclusive jurisdiction and control over the OCS, but highlighted the fact that the 
government does not own the OCS in fee simple.92  Finally, Cape Wind denied the 
argument that the Corps’ environmental review was erroneous.  Cape Wind 
asserted that the environmental assessment contained an adequate analysis on 
many alternatives.93  As to whether the data tower and the wind park should be 
treated as one single project, Cape Wind claimed that the tower was meant to 
determine the final project’s feasibility, but is not “‘the first step’” of the actual 
project.94  The data alone has independent value and use; marine and 
meteorological data that could “be of material assistance to commercial and 
recreational boaters . . . .”95
The District Court delivered an opinion denying the Alliance’s motion for 
summary judgment and granting the Corps’ and Cape Wind’s cross-motions for 
summary judgment on September 18, 2003.96  The decision first held that OCSLA 
does allow the Corps to permit offshore wind turbines, or any other structure, on 
92 Id. ¶¶ 42, 35.
93 Id. ¶ 47.
94 Id. ¶ 1.
95 Id.  The question of “independent value” is crucial to the segmentation issue, and is  
discussed in Part IV.B, infra. 
96 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 288 F. Supp. 2d 64 
(D. Mass. 2003) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and granting of defendants’ 
and intervenor’s cross motions for summary judgment).
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the OCS.97  Based upon a more literal reading of OCSLA sections 1333(a)(1) and 
1333(e), and review of the 1978 OCSLA amendments’ legislative history, the 
court determined that Congress clearly intended to preserve the Corps’ jurisdiction 
over all structures on the OCS.98  For the property rights claims, the court did not 
address the underlying substantive issue.  Rather, the court simply illustrated that 
the Corps’ regulations only require that an applicant affirm a property interest.99  It 
is not the Corps’ role to enter into property disputes with applicants.100  Lastly, the 
court did not find any NEPA violations: the Corps was not required to circulate the 
data tower FONSI for public review;101 the EA’s discussion of alternatives was 
indeed adequate;102 the data tower could be separated from the rest of the project 
and did not require an EIS;103 impacts from removing the tower will be 
insignificant.104
97 Alliance, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 72-77.
98 Alliance at 73-74.  See infra Part IV.A.
99 Alliance, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 77-78.
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 78-79.
102 Id. at 79-80.
103 Id. at 80-81.
104 Id. at 82.
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The plaintiffs are appealing the district court’s denial of summary judgment 
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.105  The Alliance and other 
individual Appellants filed an Appellant’s Brief on March 12, 2004.106  The U.S. 
Department of the Army currently has a May 12, 2004 deadline to file its 
Appellee’s Brief, after which the Alliance will file a Reply Brief.107
105 The Alliance filed a notice of intent to appeal with the district court on November 17, 
2003.  Notice of Appeal, Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 
288 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass. 2003) (No. 02-11749). 
106 General Docket, Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 
(No. 03-2604) (1st Cir.).
107 Id.
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PART III: LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 108
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 granted authority to the Corps to 
protect navigation on the nation’s navigable waters.  The major sections of the 
RHA are sections 9,109 10,110 11,111 and 13.112  Section 10 is relevant to this 
discussion. 
 RHA section 10 prohibits obstructing the navigable capacity of the waters 
of the United States without authorization by Congress or the Secretary of the 
Army.113  The RHA applies to the “navigable” waters of the United States,114
108 The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (2000).
109 RHA § 9, 33 U.S.C. § 401.  RHA § 9 applies to permits for dams, dikes, bridges, and 
causeways across navigable waters.  The Corps is responsible for granting permits for dams and 
dikes, with the consent of Congress or the state legislature for interstate and intrastate waters, 
respectively.  As of 1966, the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for permitting bridges 
and causeways.
110 RHA § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403.
111 RHA § 11, 33 U.S.C. § 404.  RHA § 11 concerns the establishment of harbor lines, which 
are the seaward limit for piers, wharves, and bulkheads.
112 RHA § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407.  RHA § 13, known as the “Refuse Act,” prohibits the 
discharge of refuse matter into navigable waters or into tributaries that lead into navigable waters, 
other than liquids from streets and sewers.  Clean Water Act § 402, 42 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000) 
assumed this program in 1972. 
113 33 U.S.C. § 403.  The relevant language of RHA § 10 reads as follows: 
“The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it 
shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin,
boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any port, roadstead,
haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or other water of the United States, outside
established harbor lines, or where no harbor lines have been established, except
on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary 
of the Army . . . .”
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which include the “territorial seas.”115  The territorial seas include “all ocean and 
coastal waters within a zone three geographic (nautical) miles seaward from the 
baseline.”116  Therefore, the Corps’ traditional section 10 jurisdiction applies to 
navigable inland waters and waters up to three nautical miles from the ordinary 
low tide line onshore.117
B. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 118
OCSLA was originally enacted in 1953,119 and was amended in 1978.120
OCSLA applies federal law and jurisdiction to the seabed, subsoil, and 
permanently or temporarily-fixed artificial islands and installations on the OCS.121
114 There is no exact definition of “navigable waters,” since the concept of navigability has 
evolved dramatically over two centuries, and is still subject to case-by-case determination.  See, 
e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 329.1 (“[33 C.F.R. § 329] defines the term ‘navigable waters of the United 
States’ as it is used to define authorities of the Corps of Engineers.”); 33 C.F.R. § 329.3 (“Precise 
definitions of ‘navigable waters of the United States’ or ‘navigability’ are ultimately dependent 
on judicial interpretation . . . .”); 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (“Navigable waters of the United States are 
those waters that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have 
been used in the past, or may be susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign commerce.”); 
33 C.F.R. § 329.6 (interstate or foreign commerce); 33 C.F.R. § 329.7 (intrastate or interstate 
nature of waterway); 33 C.F.R. § 329.8 (improved or natural conditions of the waterbody);        
33 C.F.R. § 329.9 (time at which commerce exists or determination is made); 33 C.F.R. § 329.10 
(existence of obstructions).
115 33 C.F.R. § 329.12(a).  See also Clean Water Act § 502(7), 42 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
116 33 C.F.R. § 329.12(a).
117 33 C.F.R. § 329.12(a)(1) (defining “baseline”).
118 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2000).
119 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953).
120 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 
629 (1978).
121 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2000).
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The Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to grant leases for oil and gas 
exploration and development.122   The 1978 amendments offered a more 
comprehensive framework for the development of the OCS.123  The 1978 
amendments arose out of several events, most notably of which were a major 1969 
oil spill from a drilling project, and the 1973 Arab oil embargo.124
The two sections of OCSLA that are relevant to this discussion are OSCLA 
sections 1333(a)(1)125 and 1333(e).126 The following is a comparison of the 1953 
and 1978 versions of these sections:
1953 OCSLA § 1333(a)(1)  (emphasis added)
“The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the 
United States are hereby extended to the subsoil and seabed of the outer
Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands and fixed structures which
may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing,
removing, and transporting resources therefrom . . . .”
1953 OCSLA § 1333(f)
“The authority of the Secretary of the Army to prevent obstruction to 
navigation in the navigable waters of the United States is hereby extended 
to artificial islands and fixed structures located on the Outer Continental 
Shelf.”
122 Donald T. Kramer, Construction and Application of § 4 of Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act of 1953 (43 U.S.C. 1333), Relating to Laws Applicable to Subsoil and Seabed of Outer 
Continental Shelf and Artificial Islands and Fixed Structures Erected Thereon, 163 A.L.R. Fed. 
1, 34 (2000).
123 Id. at 35.  
124 Id. at 34-35.
125 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2000).
126 43 U.S.C. § 1333(e) (2000).  Note: This section was originally numbered 1333(f). 
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1978 OCSLA § 1333(a)(1)  (emphasis added)
“The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the
United States are hereby extended to the subsoil and seabed of the
outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands, and all installations
and other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed,
which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, 
developing, or producing resources therefrom . . . .”
1978 OCSLA § 1333(e)
“The authority of the Secretary of the Army to prevent obstruction to
navigation in the navigable waters of the United States is hereby 
extended to the artificial islands, installations, and other devices referred 
to in subsection [1333(a)(1)].” 
Both the 1953 and 1978 versions of OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) apply the laws and 
jurisdiction of the United States to artificial islands and structures on the OCS.  
Likewise, the 1953 section 1333(f) and the 1978 section 1333(e) extend the Corps’ 
section 10 authority to those structures on the OCS.  
The controversial part of this language, which is discussed in Part IV.A, is 
the meaning of the phrase “which may be erected [for the purposes of resource 
extraction]” in section 1333(a)(1).  Opponents to Cape Wind argue that the use of 
“may be” excludes projects not related to resource extraction.  Conversely, 
proponents argue that the language only gives examples of some types of 
structures that are covered.
Another point of controversy is whether the 1978 amendment to section 
1333(f) limited the Corps’ jurisdiction.  The 1978 version is more specific in that 
it qualifies the types of structures over which the Corps has authority as those 
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structures listed in section 1333(a)(1).  Depending upon one’s reading of “may be” 
in section 1333(a)(1), this 1978 change could limit the Corps’ section 10 authority 
to only those structures used for resource extraction.  
C. National Environmental Policy Act 127
NEPA’s two objectives include the prevention of environmental damage, 
and the assurance that federal agencies consider environmental issues in making 
decisions.128  A major way of satisfying these objectives is through preparation of 
“a detailed statement” for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality 
of the human environment.”129  This “detailed statement,” more commonly known 
as an “Environmental Impact Statement” (“EIS”), should address (1) the proposed 
action’s environmental impacts;130 (2) unavoidable adverse impacts;131 and                 
(3) alternatives.132  Regulations issued by the Council on Environmental Quality 
(“CEQ”) expand upon these terms and requirements.133
127 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f) (2000).
128 NICHOLAS C. YOST, NEPA DESKBOOK, at 5 [hereinafter NEPA Deskbook].  See also
NEPA §§ 2, 102(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4332(2) (2000) 
129 NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
130 NEPA § 102(2)(C)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i).
131 NEPA § 102(2)(C)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(ii).
132 NEPA § 102(2)(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii).
133 The CEQ is an organization within the Executive Office of the President that adopts 
NEPA regulations applicable to all agencies and oversees agencies’ implementation of those 
regulations.  NEPA Deskbook, supra note 128, at 7.  See also NEPA § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 4342.  
The CEQ regulations are found at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517 (2002).  
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The CEQ regulations offer a comprehensive treatment of NEPA’s 
requirements.  Of these, the crux of an agency’s consideration of environmental 
impacts is whether or not to issue an EIS.  Agency proposals to which an EIS may 
apply (i.e. “major federal actions”) include (1) rules and regulations;134 (2) formal 
plans;135 (3) programs;136 and (4) approval of projects.137  The Corps’ granting of 
permits for the Cape Wind project falls under the fourth category.  A proposal may 
definitely require an EIS;138 may be categorically excluded and not require an 
EIS;139 or may fall in between these two groups.140  For this last group, the CEQ 
regulations mandate that an agency will first prepare an Environmental 
Assessment (“EA”),141 and then either find need for an EIS,142 or determine that 
the proposal will not result in any significant environmental impact.143
134 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(1).
135 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(2).
136 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(3).
137 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(4).
138 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)(1).
139 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)(2).
140 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b).
141 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b).  An EA may still be performed as a supplement to an EIS.  NEPA 
Deskbook, supra note 128, at 10.  An EA is a concise public document that (1) briefly provides 
evidence of an analysis for a determination of whether or not to initiate an EIS; (2) facilitates 
preparation of an EIS; and (3) discusses the proposal, alternatives, and impacts.  40 C.F.R.           
§ 1508.9.
142 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c).
143 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e) (Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”)).
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If the agency determines that an EIS is necessary, the next step is 
“scoping.”144  Scoping is the agency’s process of “determining the scope of issues 
to be addressed and for identifying the significant issues related to a proposed 
action.”145  In order to achieve this task, the agency must first properly delineate 
the proposal itself.146  To the extent that several actions are involved in one 
proposal, the agency will decide if those actions all fall under the scope of one  
EIS if they are (1) connected actions, meaning closely related,147 (2) cumulative 
actions with cumulative impacts,148 and (3) actions that share adequate 
similarity.149
144 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7.
145 Id.
146 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4 (“Agencies shall make sure the proposal which is the subject of an 
environmental impact statement is properly defined . . . . Proposals or parts of proposals which 
are related to each other closely enough to be, in effect, a single course of action shall be 
evaluated in a single impact statement.”).
147 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1).
148 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2).
149 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(3).
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PART IV: ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES
A. Does the Corps have jurisdiction to grant permits for structures 
on the outer continental shelf, if those structures are not related
to the extraction of oil, gas, and minerals?
The plaintiffs in Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t    
of the Army alleged in their complaint that the Corps cannot rely upon OCSLA to 
issue a permit for the data tower, since the tower “is not an installation or other 
device erected for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing oil, gas, 
or any other mineral within the meaning of OCSLA.”150  Therefore, as the 
complaint continues, “the Corps of Engineers is without jurisdiction to issue the 
permit.”151  Resolution of this matter depends upon OCSLA’s historical context, 
statutory interpretation, the appropriate level of deference for that interpretation, 
and legislative history.
i. First argument against jurisdiction: OCSLA’s historical context
Opponents to the claim that the Corps maintains section 10 jurisdiction 
over structures on the OCS that are not related to resource development first point 
to the historical context of OCSLA.152  The argument is that OCSLA has applied 
only to the extraction of natural resources in the past.153
150 Alliance Complaint, supra note 76, ¶ 33.
151 Id. ¶ 34.
152 See, e.g., Schulz, supra note 3, at 430-34.
153 Id.
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The concept of the OCS primarily derives from the 1945 Truman 
proclamation.154  In order to promote development of oil and mineral resources 
offshore, President Truman proclaimed that the nation’s jurisdiction and control 
extended over the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the OCS.155  The 
Geneva Convention recognized this claim.156
The Truman proclamation led to litigation over states’ rights over the 
submerged lands offshore.  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1947 that the federal 
government held paramount rights over the submerged lands within three miles of 
the California coast.157  Similar cases reflected this holding in 1950.158
In response to these cases, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act in 
1953 (“SLA”), which was signed by President Eisenhower.159  Although President 
Truman had been opposed to giving states control over any submerged lands, 
President Eisenhower supported the concept.160  The SLA gave coastal states 
rights to the resources found in submerged lands up to three miles offshore.161
154 H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 56 (1977).
155 Id.  See also Exec. Order. No. 9633, (1945).
156 H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 56 (1977).
157 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
158 United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); U.S. v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
159 Submerged Lands Act, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.      
§§ 1301-1315 (2000)).
160 See Schulz, supra note 3, at 431.
161 H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 57 (1977).
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However, even after the SLA, there was still an open question of how the federal 
government was to manage the mineral resources on the OCS.162
Congress therefore passed OCSLA in 1953,163 a few months after the SLA.  
OCSLA amended the SLA, and provided for federal authority over mineral 
resources on the OCS.164  The 1953 OCSLA allowed the Secretary of the Interior 
to lease portions of the OCS for natural resources development.165   By the 1970s, 
however, revision of OCSLA was deemed necessary because the 1953 Act was 
not specific enough for the Secretary to effectively manage the OCS.166
Given that the Truman Proclamation, the SLA, and the 1953 OCSLA all 
dealt with offshore mineral development, Cape Wind opponents now argue that 
OCSLA section 1333 is specifically limited to structures used for those purposes.  
The argument is based upon the fact that “nothing but the development of oil and 
related minerals is discussed [in those documents].”167  In turn, the policies and 
concerns leading up to the 1953 OCSLA “[make no reference] to the development 
of renewable sources of energy on the outer continental shelf.”168
162 Id.
163 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified as amended at 
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2000)).
164 H.R. REP. NO. 95-590, at 57 (1977).
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Schulz, supra note 3, at 434.
168 Id.
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ii. Second argument against jurisdiction: The 1978 amendments 
restricted the Corps’ jurisdiction
The plaintiffs’ complaint in Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of the Army argues that the 1978 OCSLA amendments limited the 
Corps’ jurisdiction over structures on the OCS.169  Previously, the 1953 Act made 
a general pronouncement that the Secretary of the Army’s authority was extended 
“to artificial islands and fixed structures located on the outer Continental Shelf.”170
This language suggests that the Corps had jurisdiction over any type of structure, 
because this section does not make any reference to structures “which may be 
erected [for the purposes of resource extraction].”171  The 1978 amendment 
introduced seemingly more limiting language, which is offered by opponents as 
evidence that the Corps may not permit wind turbines on the OCS.172
The 1978 OCSLA amendments changed the 1953 OCSLA section 
1333(f).173  The amendment to 1333(f) introduced a specific reference to the types 
of structures over which the Corps may exert jurisdiction: 
“Section 4 of such Act is amended . . . in subsection (f), by striking 
out ‘artificial islands and fixed structures located on the outer
169 Alliance Complaint, supra note 76, ¶¶ 24, 33-34.
170 43 U.S.C. § 1333(f) (1953).
171 Id.  See also U.S. v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970) (interpreting the 1953 OCSLA, and 
holding that an offshore construction project on the OCS that would install caissons and pilings 
requires a section 10 permit from the Corps).
172 Alliance, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 73-74.
173 Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 203(e)(2) (1978).
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Continental Shelf’ and inserting in lieu thereof ‘the artificial islands,
installations, and other devices referred to in subsection (a)’. . . .”174
This referred to section 1333(a)(1), which mentions artificial islands and 
installations “which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, 
developing, or producing resources therefrom . . . .”175  The plaintiffs focused 
upon the term “which may be” as a limiting clause.176  This view reads OCSLA 
section 1333(a)(1) in a narrow manner, as mandating that the only structures 
covered are those that are related to resource extraction.177
iii. First argument for jurisdiction: Statutory interpretation 
The Corps has historically maintained that the current OCSLA section 
1333(e) does not limit its jurisdiction to only certain types of structures.178  The 
Corps’ regulations state that OCSLA extended its authority to structures on the 
OCS, but does not qualify the types of structures.179  Furthermore, a 1988 
regulatory guidance letter to developers who wished to build casinos on the OCS 
explicitly stated that a section 10 permit was required for any structure, 
174 Id.
175 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1).
176 See Alliance Complaint, supra note 76, ¶ 24.
177 See, e.g., Schulz, supra note 3, at 439 (“[T]he Army Corps regulatory jurisdiction over 
‘navigable waters’ is limited to three miles from shore; as such, it needs to rely on the OCSLA for 
an extension of its authority to regulate beyond three miles.  But, the OCSLA only gives the 
Army Corps special regulatory powers for obstruction to navigation for installations or other 
devices erected for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing oil, gas, or any other 
mineral within the meaning of the OCSLA.”).
178 33 C.F.R. § 320.2(b).  See also 33 C.F.R. §§ 322.3(b), 322.5(f).
179 33 C.F.R. § 320.2(b).
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“regardless of the purpose they would serve.”180  Even if there is an argument that 
the 1953 OCSLA only applied to mineral resources and that the 1978 amendments 
narrowed the Corps’ jurisdiction, the Corps’ own interpretation of OCSLA section 
1333 is entitled to deference.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.181 stated that courts confront two 
questions when reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it 
administers.182  The first question is whether Congress directly spoke to the 
question at issue, meaning that congressional intent is clear.183  If this is the case, 
then the court and the agency must give effect to that expressed intent.184  If 
congressional intent is unclear and the statutory language is silent or ambiguous, 
however, then the second question is whether the agency’s interpretation is based 
upon a permissible and reasonable construction.185  The agency’s interpretation 
180 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Regulation of Artificial Islands, Installations, and 
Structures on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf, Regulatory Guidance Letter 88-08 (July 20, 1988) 
(expired Dec. 31, 1990).
181 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
182
“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for 
Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to 
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-
27 (2001).  Although the Department of the Interior has primary responsibility over the OCS, the 
Corps’ administration of section 10 permits on the OCS entitles it to deference in its 
interpretation of OCSLA.  Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 
288 F. Supp. 2d 64, 76-77 (D. Mass. 2003).
183 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 843.
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need not be the only permissible interpretation.186  Consequently, agency 
regulations will be upheld “unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.”187
Although it is possible that OCSLA sections 1333(a)(1) and 1333(e) are 
sufficiently clear as to authorize the Corps’ jurisdiction over all OCS structures, it 
is more likely that section 1333(a)(1) is ambiguous.  The district court in Alliance 
to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army188 expressed its belief 
that the 1978 OCSLA was sufficiently clear.189  The court focused upon the use of 
the words “all artificial islands” and “all installations” in the statute as an 
indication that Congress intended jurisdiction over all structures (some of which 
may be used for resource extraction).190
This may be true.  Nevertheless, the Alliance opinion does not focus upon 
the words “which may be [used for resource extraction]” enough to unequivocally 
establish that section 1333(a)(1) is clear.  As long as the section may be 
interpreted to mean that the Corps should only have jurisdiction over structures 
related to resource extraction, as the Alliance claims,191 then it seems doubtful that 
186 Id. n.11.
187 Id. at 844.
188 Alliance, 288 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass. 2003).
189 Alliance, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 75.
190 Id. (emphasis added).
191 Alliance Complaint, supra note 76, ¶¶ 25, 33-34.
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congressional intent is really apparent.  It does not matter ultimately, though, 
because even if section 1333(a)(1) is ambiguous, then the analysis shifts to the 
reasonableness of the Corps’ interpretation.192
The Corps’ position that OCSLA allows the agency to issue section 10 
permits for any structure on the OCS is reasonable for two reasons.  First, the 
terms “which may be” in section 1333(a)(1) could either be restrictive or merely 
suggestive.  There is no definitive guidance or indication of intent as to this 
particular matter.  The original purpose of OCSLA was the development of 
minerals and resources on the OCS.  Yet there is no official indication that the 
approval of structures that serve alternate purposes but are still related to energy 
development are absolutely impermissible.  Second, the legislative history for the 
1978 OCSLA amendments does state that the amendments were not intended to 
alter the original 1953 grant of jurisdiction.  
iv. Second argument for jurisdiction: 1978 legislative history 
The legislative history for the 1978 OCSLA amendments193 contains a clear 
statement that the alteration of the old section 1333(f) was not meant to change the 
Corps’ authority.  The House Conference Report for S. 9194 discusses the change 
to section 1333(f), which inserted a specific reference to the structures as listed in 
section 1333(a)(1).  The Report states the following:
192 Alliance, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 76.
193 S. 9, 95th Cong. (1978), Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978).
194 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1474 (1978).
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“This authority has been used by the Corps of Engineers to regulate
the construction and location of such things as artificial fishing reefs, 
radio towers, and a proposed gambling casino that was to be constructed
on reefs.  It also applies to structures erected for the purpose of exploring
for and transporting resources, such as oil drilling rigs.
The existing authority of the Corps of Engineers, in [section 1333(f)],
applies to all artificial islands and fixed structures on the outer 
continental shelf, whether or not they are erected for the purpose of
exploring for, developing, removing and transporting resources therefrom.
The amendment to [section 1333(f)] is not intended to change the scope
of this authority, but merely to conform the description of the types of
structures, no matter what their purpose, to the types of structures listed 
in [section 1333(a)(1)].” 
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1474, at 81-82 (1978) (emphasis added).
This is very clear as to congressional intent.  Since OCSLA sections 1333(a) and 
1333(f) are not so clear as to the Corps’ appropriate authority, reference to 
legislative history is therefore appropriate and useful.195
195 A court should resort to using legislative history when a statute’s text is ambiguous.  
Otherwise it is not appropriate, or at least less useful.  See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union 
v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (declining to consult legislative history because 
definition of “‘basic cable service’” was written “with crystalline clarity,” and noting that 
legislative history is useful only when statutory language is “‘genuinely ambiguous’”) (quoting 
FAIC Securities, Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
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B. Assuming that the Corps has jurisdiction to permit wind turbines      
on the outer continental shelf, what portion of an offshore wind  
project is subject to an environmental impact statement?
Although NEPA segmentation issues often arise in the context of highway 
construction,196 they can factor into any EIS scoping matter.  In the case of Cape 
Wind, the Corps treated the tower separately, and issued an EA instead of 
subjecting the tower to the overall environmental review.197  This was a correct 
decision, because the data tower’s existence is independent of the wind park, and 
it also has independent utility.  
i. The three types of actions subject to a single EIS
Before one reaches the conclusion that the data tower should not be 
included in the project’s scoping, the most relevant category of reviewable action 
must be determined.  40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 establishes three categories of actions 
that may be addressed in an EIS.198  These three actions are (1) connected 
196 See, e.g., Pres. Endangered Areas of Cobb’s History, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 87 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Corps was correct in segmenting a 
county road construction project and in not requiring an EIS); Conservation Law Found. v. 
FHWA, 24 F.3d 1465 (1st Cir. 1994) (determining that segmentation of a four-lane highway 
project in Rhode Island was proper).
197 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Environmental Assessment and Statement of Findings for 
Application No. 199902477, at 14, http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/projects/ma/ccwt/ea.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 31, 2004) (“I find that based on the evaluation of environmental effects discussed in 
this document, the decision on this application [for the data tower] is not a major federal action 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.  Hence, an environmental impact 
statement is not required.”) [hereinafter EA].
198 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a).
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actions,199 (2) cumulative actions,200 and (3) similar actions.201  At best, the Corps’ 
permitting of the Cape Wind data tower arguably falls under “connected actions.”
ii. Two categories that do not apply
Cape Wind phases one and two are not cumulative actions.  Actions are 
“cumulative” if when taken into consideration together, they “have cumulatively 
significant impacts and should therefore be discussed in the same impact 
statement.”202  The impacts to be considered may be broad and “reasonably 
foreseeable.”203  The reason why Cape Wind phases one and two are not 
cumulative is that regardless of the environmental impacts of the final wind park, 
the impacts of the temporary data tower are negligible.  The data tower involves 
driving three steel pilings one hundred feet into the seabed.204  In its EA, the Corps 
determined that of all the pubic interest factors relevant to the tower, there may be 
some potential impact on wildlife as the pilings are driven into the seabed.205
However, those impacts “are being mitigated by permit conditions,” and “[o]ther 
199 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1).
200 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2).
201 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(3).
202 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2).
203 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (defining “cumulative impact” as something that “results from the 
incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable 
future actions . . .”).
204 Tower Application Notice, supra note 32.
205 EA, supra note 197, at 4.
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impacts to fish and wildlife species in the area are expected to be non-
consequential due to the size and design of the project.”206  Given that the 
relatively small impacts from one tower are miniscule compared to the potential 
effects of the 130-tower wind park, there is no need to incorporate the data tower 
into the overall project as being “cumulative.”
Phases one and two may be similar, but not to a significant extent.  “Similar 
actions” are those activities that “have similarities that provide a basis for 
evaluating their environmental consequences together, such as common timing or 
geography.”207  In this case, the only similarity between phases one and two is 
general geography, and even then only to a limited degree.  The data tower was 
erected in 2002, and it will be disassembled before the wind park’s construction 
begins.  The tower is located in Nantucket Sound, but the 900 square feet used to 
support the tower cannot compare to the twenty-four square miles that the wind 
park will occupy.208  The tower is also smaller than the actual wind turbines, and it 
does not require the embedded network of electrical cables that the wind park will 
require.209
206 Id.
207 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(3).
208 See EA, supra note 197, at 1.
209 Reynolds, supra note 35.
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iii. Connected actions
The only category of activity that can arguably apply is that of connected 
actions.  “Connected actions” are “closely related and therefore should be 
discussed in the same impact statement.”210  There are three subcategories of 
connected actions: those that (1) automatically trigger other actions;211 (2) depend 
upon other previous or simultaneous actions in order to proceed;212 and (3) are 
interdependent upon a broader action in order to be justified.213
The data tower and the wind park do not in any way satisfy the first two 
subcategories.  Cape Wind’s installation of the data tower does not automatically 
trigger the wind park.214  The data tower was not required in order to proceed with 
the wind park, although it is very helpful for determining the most effective design 
for the wind park.215  In addition, although the Corps granted a permit for phase 
one, phase two is still undergoing a stringent environmental review.  The ultimate 
outcome and future of the proposed wind park as designed is not definite.  The 
210 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1).
211 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)(i).
212 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)(ii).
213 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)(iii).
214 Tower Application Notice, supra note 32.
215 EA, supra note 197, at 9 (stating that “[a]lthough the data is intended to be used by the 
applicant to assist them in the engineering design for the wind project, it is not mandated by any 
regulatory requirement”).
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data tower also does not depend upon other simultaneous actions or circumstances, 
since by definition it is the first phase of a two-phase project.
Opponents of the current Cape Wind project, and of other future projects, 
could argue that phases one and two are nevertheless connected and therefore 
should be addressed together in an EIS.  There is indeed an identifiable link 
between the two phases, in that the data tower was built to facilitate the wind 
park’s ultimate design and construction.  If the tower’s installation and purpose is 
solely justified by the proposed wind park, then there would be interdependency.  
If, however, the data tower could be erected regardless of whether the wind park is 
constructed, then the Corps cannot be accused of improperly segmenting the 
project.
The determining factor in this case is whether the data tower can exist 
without the wind park being built, and vice versa.  The fact that Cape Wind chose 
to build a data tower in order to confirm the wind park’s viability does not matter.  
This is a question of function, and not of intent.
The best test in this area of law arises from the Ninth Circuit case of Trout 
Unlimited v. Morton.216 Morton involved a challenge to an EIS for a dam and 
reservoir project.217  The first phase involved the dam itself.218  The second and 
216 Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974).
217 Morton, 509 F.2d at 1278.
218 Id. at 1279.
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later phase was an irrigation project.219  Challengers claimed that the EIS for the 
dam project was inadequate because it did not take into account the second phase, 
(even though the second phase has not been approved by the Secretary of the 
Interior).220  The challengers’ argument relied upon cases in which a series of 
interrelated steps constituted a single plan.221  The court distinguished those cases 
from the dam situation because the dam project was not dependent upon 
subsequent phases of the development plan.222  As a test, the court proposed that 
interdependency exists when “[it] is such that it would be irrational, or at least 
unwise, to undertake the first phase if subsequent phases were not also 
undertaken.”223
Another instructive case in this area is Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers.224 Wetlands Action Network involved a multiple-phase 
real estate development.  One of the phases involved filling in several acres of 
federally delineated wetlands, which required a section 404 permit from the 
Corps.225  Challengers to the permit argued that the Corps improperly divided the 
219 Id. at 1284.
220 Id. at 1284-85.
221 Id. at 1285.
222 Morton, 509 F.2d at 1285.
223 Id.
224 Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 222 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 
2000).  
225 Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1111.
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project into three phases, one of which did not require an EIS.226   The Corps 
claimed that each phase of the development plan had independent viability.227  The 
court determined that one phase could be built even if another phase was not 
built.228  As in the Cape Wind situation, even though the project’s developer in 
Wetlands Action Network intended that multiple phases complement each other, 
the fact was that each single phase did not affect the other.
The rule to be discerned from these cases is that even though a master 
project may consist of multiple phases, there is no interdependency if one phase 
can proceed even if another does not proceed.  In the Cape Wind situation, the 
Corps did grant a permit for the data tower, but there is a small chance that the 
Corps may not grant a permit for the wind park because of potential environmental 
impacts.  Although it is unlikely, the chance that something may prevent the wind 
park from being constructed as planned means that the data tower’s existence does 
not depend solely upon the wind park’s viability.
From Cape Wind’s perspective, the use of a data tower is not mandatory.  It 
is just a form of insurance.  Hypothetically, the data tower could have indicated 
that the wind park would not be feasible, resulting in an alteration of the plans or 
even abandonment of the project.  Conversely, a less risk-adverse company may 
226 Id. at 1112.
227 Id. at 1111.
228 Id. at 1119.
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have undertaken the same project without first using a data tower, relying only 
upon already-available scientific information.  Regardless of the situation, the 
Cape Wind project passes the Morton test.  It is not irrational for Cape Wind, or 
any other developer, to undertake the first phase without knowing if the second 
phase will ever come to fruition.  It is undesirable if a project cannot be 
completed, but that is the risk that each developer takes.  It would only be 
irrational to not begin testing until after the Corps has completed a prolonged 
review process for the entire project. 
iv. Independent utility
That the data tower exists solely for the proposed wind park is the 
Alliance’s argument in the Cape Wind litigation.229  Cape Wind responded in its 
answer that the data tower does not exist solely to support the project.230  In turn, 
Cape Wind distinguished the tower from the project by arguing for independent 
utility:231
“[The] research obtained at the [data tower] will have significant 
independent utility, including providing a facility for gathering 
data on the wind, ocean, current, and atmospheric conditions in 
Nantucket Sound; information which will allow for a better
understanding of our ocean environment and atmosphere, and be
of material assistance to commercial and recreational boaters,
among others.”232
229 Alliance Complaint, supra note 76, ¶ 15 (“The sole basis for the construction of this 
facility is support of Cape Wind’s development of its overall wind power project.”).
230 Cape Wind Answer, supra note 90, ¶ 1. 
231 Id. 
232 Id.
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At first glance, Cape Wind’s claim seems disingenuous.  Surely the company did 
not erect the data tower for the benefit of the general population’s understanding 
of the local environment.  This is true.  Cape Wind did install the tower in order to 
assess Nantucket Sound’s suitability for the project.  If the information gained is 
later useful to the community, then that is an added benefit.  However, as with the 
connectedness analysis above, a project’s nature depends upon its function, and 
not upon the builder’s intentions.  In this case, even though Cape Wind erected the 
data tower with the wind park in mind, that does not mean that the data gathered 
has no other uses outside of the project’s realm. 
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PART V: RECENTLY PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A. H.R. 5156, 107th Cong. (2002),233  H.R. 793, 108th Cong. (2003)234
Representative Barbara Cubin (R-WY) sponsored H.R. 5156 and 
introduced it on July 18, 2002.235  H.R. 5156 was referred to the House Committee 
on Resources on July 18, 2002, and referred to the Subcommittee on Energy and 
Mineral Resources on July 23, 2002.236  The Subcommittee held hearings on July 
25, 2002, after which no further legislative action was taken.237  Representative 
Cubin introduced a nearly identical bill on February 13, 2003 (H.R. 793).238
H.R. 793 (the “Cubin Bill”) was referred to the House Committee on Resources on 
February 13, 2003, and referred to the Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral 
Resources on February 21, 2003.239  No formal legislative action was taken.240
233 The official title of H.R. 5156 was “To amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to 
protect the economic and land use interests of the Federal Government in the management of 
outer continental shelf lands for energy-related and certain other purposes, and for other 
purposes.”
234 The official title of H.R. 793 was “To amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to 
authorize the Secretary of the Interior to grant easements and rights-of-way on the Outer 
Continental Shelf for activities otherwise authorized by the Act.”
235 Bill’s status is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d107query.html (last visited Apr. 20, 
2004).
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Bill’s status is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d108query.html (last visited Apr. 20, 
2004).
239 Id.
240 Id.
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These bills sought to create a system in which the Secretary of the Interior 
could grant easements and rights-of-way on the OCS.241  Activities subject to this 
system would include (1) the “exploration, development, production, 
transportation, or storage of oil, natural gas, or other minerals”242 and (2) the 
“production, transportation, or transmission of energy from sources other than oil 
or gas.”243  Naturally the latter one subjects offshore wind power facilities such as 
the Cape Wind project to the Secretary’s authority.  In turn, these easements and 
rights-of-way would be obtained by either a competitive or non-competitive 
basis.244  Those parties that obtained easements or rights-of-way would be subject 
to annual or one-time payments.245
The added benefits of this legislation would be the centralization of 
management of offshore energy-related projects, and the establishment of a 
structured process for project applicants.246  This would be more efficient because 
a company like Cape Wind would start the permitting process with the Department 
of the Interior, which would then act as a manager and facilitator with other 
241 H.R. 5156, 107th Cong. § 1(b) (2002); H.R. 793, 108th Cong. § 1(b) (2003).
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Outer Continental Shelf Energy Leasing: Hearing on H.R. 5156 Before the House 
Committee on Resources, Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, 107th Cong. (2002) 
(statement of Johnnie Burton, Director, Minerals Management Service, U.S. Department of the 
Interior).
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agencies and with the applicant.247  There would be no more controversy over 
which agencies may participate in such permitting decisions.248  In return for this 
certainty, wind energy companies would pay for easements and rights-of-way.249
Commentators, however, noted that although these bills address one  
problem through agency coordination, there remains the problem of identifying 
suitable lands on the OCS for future projects,250 and the proper allocation of OCS 
lands.251  Although it is not apparent that Representative Cubin intended that H.R. 
5156 and H.R. 793 address all these matters, any final revision of the current 
permitting scheme will have to be comprehensive so that future project developers 
do not encounter uncertainty. 
247 Id.
248 Id. 
249 Outer Continental Shelf Lands; Federal Coal Resources: Hearings on H.R. 793 Before 
the House Committee on Resources, Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, 108th
Cong. (2003) (statement of Bruce H. Bailey, President, AWS Scientific, Inc.).
250 See, e.g., Outer Continental Shelf Lands; Federal Coal Resources: Hearings on H.R. 793 
Before the House Committee on Resources, Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, 
108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Thomas F. Reilly, Massachusetts Attorney General) (suggesting 
identifying sites in advance that “provide the greatest source of energy with the least damage to 
the environment”).
251 See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 3, at 447 (“however, the proposed legislation lacks 
substance in providing exactly how or in what manner easements and rights of way will be 
granted in submerged lands and to whom.”).
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B. Coastal Zone Renewable Energy Promotion Act of 2003, 
H.R. 1183, 108th Cong. (2003)
Opposed to the Cape Wind project’s progress due to the lack of a federal 
approval scheme, Representative William D. Delahunt (D-MA)252 introduced  
H.R. 1183 on March 11, 2003.253  The bill was referred to the House Committee 
on Resources, and on March 25, 2003 it was referred to the Subcommittee on 
Energy and Mineral Resources and to the Subcommittee on Fisheries 
Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans.254  The bill stalled in subcommittee, as 
attempts to incorporate it into the 2003 Energy Bill were unsuccessful.255
H.R. 1183 directs the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the 
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(“NOAA”), to select sites, develop regulations and govern renewable energy in the 
marine environment.256  The basis for this bill was the belief that existing laws do 
not address adequately the issues raised by offshore wind energy facilities, and 
that revised laws are necessary before offshore development may proceed.257  The 
252 Representative Delahunt’s congressional district includes Cape Cod.
253 Bill’s status is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d108query.html (last visited Apr. 21, 
2004).
254 Id.
255 Donna Goodison, Ocean “zoning” will top agenda for task force, The Boston Herald, 
June 4, 2003, 2003 WL 3027075.
256 H.R. 1183, 108th Cong. §§ 202, 2(b) (2003).
257 Id. §§ 2(a)(4)-(5).
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bill amends several sections of the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”)258 to 
achieve these purposes.259
H.R. 1183 first amends CZMA section 309(a)260 to identify objectives.  
Among these are (1) identifying priority locations; (2) ensuring access for fishing; 
(3) environmental reviews; (4) navigational and public safety; (5) payment for 
removal of facilities; (6) assessing the need for renewable facilities; and (6) taking 
into account national security.261
The bill then adds a new section to the end of the current CZMA.  The 
proposed CZMA section 314 contains many requirements for constructing 
renewable energy facilities in ocean waters.  Those who intend to install such 
facilities must obtain a license.262  In order to receive a license, applicants must 
first give the Secretary of Commerce written notice of intent, after which the 
Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register the requirements for a license 
application for the particular site, and shall request proposals.263  Applications will 
258 Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1456 (2000).  The CZMA was 
enacted in 1972.  It allows coastal states to voluntarily manage and protect coastal zones in a 
cooperative federal-state effort.  CZMA § 303, 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (2000).  States develop coastal 
management plans, and federal activities that are reasonably expected to affect the coastal zone’s 
land or water use or natural resources must show consistency with the plan.  CZMA § 307, 16 
U.S.C. § 1456 (2000).
259 H.R. 1183, 108th Cong. §§ 3, 101, 201 (2003).
260 CZMA § 309(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1456b(a) (“Coastal zone enhancement objective” defined).
261 H.R. 1183, 108th Cong. § 101(1) (2003).
262 H.R. 1183, 108th Cong. § 201 (2003).
263 Id.
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be evaluated according to proposed energy production, economic impact, 
environmental impacts, and displacement of current services.264  Before the 
Secretary issues a license, many other factors must be considered, including 
recommendations from the Secretary of Defense, Corps of Engineers, and Coast 
Guard; consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of 
Energy; review of environmental and commercial impacts; and the payment of 
fees.265  The application must be subject to notice and comment, and the affected 
coastal area would host a public hearing.266  Completed licenses are subject to fees 
and annual royalties.267
C. Energy Policy Act of 2003, S. 2095, 108th Cong. (2004)
The current 2004 energy bill that is pending in the Senate is a carryover 
from the past congressional session.  It contains language pertaining to regulation 
of OCS energy production that is nearly identical to the Cubin bill.268  However 
there is concern that the language may exempt the Cape Wind project from such 
regulation.  The legislative history of S. 2095 establishes the context.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Compare S. 2095, 108th Cong. § 321 (2004) and H.R. 793, 108th Cong. §1(b) (2003).
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In April 2003, both the House and Senate introduced energy bills.269  The 
House version, H.R. 6,270 did not address alternative energy production on the 
OCS.271  The Senate version, S.14,272 did contain a section that was similar to the 
Cubin bill.273  S. 14 section 110 amends OCSLA section 1337 by establishing an 
OCS easement or right-of-way program regulated by the Secretary of the Interior, 
which partially applies to the “production, transportation, or transmission of 
energy from sources other than oil and gas . . . .”274  The provision also mandated 
“a fair return” for easements and rights-of-way.275
The Senate ultimately adopted H.R. 6, but with major changes.  H.R. 6 
passed the House on April 11, 2003, was received by the Senate on April 29, 2003 
and was placed on the Senate’s legislative calendar in May 2003.276  In the 
meantime between May and July 2003, both S. 14 and H.R. 6 were pending in the 
269 Bill’s status is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d108query.html (last visited Apr. 22, 
2004).
270 The Energy Policy Act of 2003, H.R. 6, 108th Cong. (2003).  
271 Representatives Cubin and Delahunt’s bills were being considered separately in 
committee in the spring of 2003.
272 The Energy Policy Act of 2003, S. 14, 108th  Cong. (2003).
273 S. 14, 108th  Cong. § 110 (2003).
274 Id. § 110(a).
275 Id.
276 Bill’s status is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d108query.html (last visited Apr. 21, 
2004).
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Senate.277  Due to excessive debate in the Senate over S. 14, the Senate voted on 
July 31, 2003 to adopt the previous year’s energy bill, H.R. 4, instead.278  H.R. 4279
had passed the Senate but did not survive conference committee in October 
2002.280  In this strategic move meant to get an energy bill to conference, the 
Senate passed H.R. 6 amended with the text from H.R. 4.281
Although H.R. 6 and H.R. 4 did not contain language concerning 
alternative energy development on the OCS, the final conference report did 
contain such language.  H.R. 6 was significantly revised in conference.282
Language nearly identical to the Cubin bill was inserted into H.R. 6 sometime 
during conference.283  Conference Report 108-375284 contained section 321 
277 S. 14 was considered by the Senate between May and July 2003.  H.R. 6 was received in 
the Senate on April 29, 2003 and remained on the calendar between May and July 2003.  
Information on each bill’s status is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d108query.html (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2004).
278 American Feed Industry Association, Senate Pulls 11th Hour Ploy; Passes Previous 
Energy Bill, http://www.afia.org/Feedgram_Articles/August_12_2003/Energy_Bill.html (last 
visited April 22, 2004) [hereinafter 11th Hour].
279 Energy Policy Act of 2002, H.R. 4, 107th Cong. (2002).  
280 Bill’s status is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d107query.html (last visited Apr. 22, 
2004).
281 11th Hour, supra note 278 (“Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D, SD), who came up 
with the idea, summed it up best: ‘This just gets us to conference.  After that, it’s wide open.’”).
282 This was intended after the Senate passed H.R. 4.  11th Hour, supra note 278 (“Senate 
Energy Committee Chair Pete Domenici (R, AZ) said he supported the compromise action 
because ‘I’ll rewrite the whole bill in conference.’”).
283 Jack Coleman, What’s in bill for wind farm? Wording in the federal energy measure is 
open to conflicting interpretation from parties involved, Cape Cod Times, Jan. 3, 2004, 
http://www.saveoursound.org/news/timesart10304.html (last visited April 22, 2004).
284 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 108-375 (2003).
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(“Alternate energy-related uses on the Outer Continental Shelf”).285  Section 321 
amends OCSLA section 1337, and provides that the Secretary of the Interior “may 
grant a lease, easement, or right-of-way” on the OCS.286  Activities that involve 
the “production, transportation, or transmission of energy from sources other than 
oil and gas” are subject to this scheme.287  As in the Cubin Bill, leases,288
easements, and rights-of-way would be obtained either competitively or 
noncompetitively, and would be subject to payments and fees.289  The conference 
report’s later explanation of each title and subtitle does not offer any commentary 
on section 321.290
The post-conference report H.R. 6 almost passed as the 2003 energy bill.  
However a Senate filibuster prevailed over Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist’s 
285 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 108-375, at 80-81 (2003).
286 Id. at 80.  The Secretary of the Interior would work through the Minerals Management 
Service.
287 Id.
288 The Cubin bill did not mention “leases.”  See H.R. 793, 108th Cong. § 1(b) (2003).
289 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 108-375, at 80 (2003).
290 Id. at 450.
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motion to invoke cloture.291  The Senate filibuster was primarily due to H.R. 6’s 
waiver of liability for MTBE.292
The 2003 energy bill did return in the 108th Congress’ second session, this 
time as S. 2095 (“the Energy Policy Act of 2003”).293  S. 2095 was introduced in 
the Senate on February 12, 2004 and is pending as of April 2004.294   S. 2095 
contains the same section 321 as in the H.R. 6 conference report.295
Section 321 is also why Conference Report 108-375 and S. 2095 are 
controversial to proponents of stricter OCS regulation.  Both the conference report 
and S. 2095 contain a savings provision for section 321.296  Concerning the 
resubmittal of documents or reauthorizations, the savings provision states that 
section 321 does not apply to projects “for which offshore test facilities have been 
constructed.”297  This may mean that any project that has already installed a test 
291 Senate Vote To End Filibuster On Energy Bill Fails, http://groups.msn.com/AAEA/ 
energy.msnw (last visited Apr. 22, 2004).
292 Id. (“A main sticking point that caused the energy bill to fail was the MTBE liability 
exemption.  The exemption provides protection from lawsuits for makers of the fuel additive 
methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE), which has been found to contaminate groundwater.”).
293 Energy Policy Act of 2003, S. 2095, 108th Cong. (2004).
294 Bill’s status is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d108query.html (last visited Apr. 22, 
2004).
295 Compare S. 2095, 108th Cong. § 321 (2004) with H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 108-375, at 80-81 
(2003). 
296 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 108-375, at 81 (2003); S. 2095, 108th Cong. § 321(c) (2004). 
297 Id.
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facility (such as Cape Wind and its data tower)298 need not submit to new reviews 
or regulatory hurdles.  This is the more selective interpretation, suggesting that the 
Cape Wind project need not go through more permitting and studies, but may still 
come under the Department of the Interior’s jurisdiction if S. 2095 becomes 
law.299  Another interpretation, however, suggests that the savings provision 
completely exempts Cape Wind from section 321’s oversight.300  There is no 
definitive indication as to the drafter’s intent.
298 Section 321 does not mention Cape Wind by name.  However, Cape Wind is the only 
project to date to fit the terms of S. 2095, 108th Cong. § 321(c) (2004).  See Coleman, supra note 
283 (“Cape Wind attorney Dennis Duffy agreed the provision would affect the Nantucket Sound 
project, but denied Cape Wind lobbied for it and was uncertain of its origin.”).  
299 Cape Wind shows its D.C clout: Political maneuverings behind “alternative” energy are 
starting to look very much like the old-fashioned Washington business-as-usual, Cape Cod Voice, 
December, 2003, http://www.saveoursound.org/edits/ccvoiceedit121803.html (last visited April 
22, 2004).
300 See id.
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PART VI: CONCLUSION
Even if the Cape Wind project manages to survive the appeal in the First 
Circuit, other proposed projects in the near future may face similar litigation.  
Despite the best arguments offered by Cape Wind’s proponents, there is no 
uniform answer yet as to what the federal government’s proper role is in 
permitting offshore wind projects.  Although this thesis addressed two of the 
major federal law issues, many other issues will also arise.  This is why some 
nationwide system to manage this promising industry is necessary.  
There are several possibilities to remedy this situation.  So long as 
Congress creates a centralized system that demarcates the procedures for 
applications, review, and inter-agency responsibilities, then offshore wind energy 
will prosper in this country.  Each of the proposed bills discussed in Part V have 
merit in that they attempt to establish a centralized system.  The Cubin bill places 
primary authority in the Department of the Interior.  Representative Delahunt’s bill 
names NOAA as the lead agency.  Another option would be to clarify OCSLA 
section 1333(a)(1) and formally grant permitting authority to the Corps.  This 
would involve amending the disputed language concerning what kinds of 
structures the Corps may permit.  Although OCSLA primarily addresses 
conventional resources such as oil and gas, the Corps has the expertise to evaluate 
and permit turbine structures on the OCS.  If this were the case, though, the Corps 
should still share responsibility with DOI or NOAA, since overall management of 
the OCS is not the Corps’ responsibility.  
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Regardless of what formal system is created, Congress should ensure that 
the system encourages offshore wind project development, and does not impede it.  
There is a sensible way to develop this new energy source in a manner that is well-
planned and yet competitive.  If this does occur, then the costs of building offshore 
wind parks will decrease in time, and energy companies may become inclined to 
adopt offshore wind power as a more conventional energy source.    
